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Abstract 
The motivation for this theoretical paper is to “shed further light” on electricity market liberalisation. The major 
influences on electricity prices in each country are local supply and demand conditions, which include costs of 
renewables and/or regulatory effects on pricing. This also includes effects of public or private monopoly pricing. 
However, many countries from a representative sample of groups of economies, show long-term equilibrium 
relationships in their electricity and energy stock market sectors. In these countries in the short-term, exogeneity 
lies with the energy sectors in the EMU, the UK, New Zealand, the Philippines, Hong Kong and Thailand. In the 
cases of the US and India the electricity markets are exogenous, which is probably due to the sheer size of those 
markets. Where there is evidence of cointegration the nexus between electricity and energy sectors remains and 
the strength of this relationship is indicative of greater progress in electricity market liberalisation. This is 
because their electricity prices are influenced to a significant degree by global fossil fuel supply costs. In those 
cases domestic factors such as cost of regulatory environments are less important.  
Keywords: energy sector, electricity, VECM, VAR, Granger, causality, pricing, regulatory environment, 
country, fossil fuels 
JEL: C22, C52, O13, Q43 
1. Introduction 
The central point of this study is that those electricity markets, whose costings largely depend on global fossil 
fuel prices, possess a greater degree of deregulation than those markets that do not have such a high reliance on 
world energy prices. That is, these markets are less reliant on government intervention or private or public 
monopoly pricing. This study differs from previous studies as it utilises energy stock market data to represent 
global fossil fuel prices. The study also examines a greater range of country electricity markets in a dynamic 
analytical framework. 
The paper is motivated by a need for a straightforward analytical method to broadly explain the progress and 
extent of country electricity market deregulation. The study expands a contemporaneous study in an auto 
regressive conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH) model by Simpson, Buyukkara and Mon Abraham (2012). 
Similar relationships are herewith examined in a vector error correction (VECM) model in order to ascertain if 
optimally lagged models provide a better fit and assist in providing a better explanation of the forces behind 
electricity market deregulation. The study therefore relaxes the assumption of contemporaneous adjustment of 
energy and electricity markets.  
The sample of countries is representative of economic groups for the OECD, Latin America and Asia. The 
strongest significant relationships in their unlagged models over two sub-periods of differing fossil fuel price 
volatility were the EMU, China, the US, India, Chile, UK, Brazil, Canada, Hong Kong, Thailand, Malaysia, 
Argentina and New Zealand in that order. The assumption of contemporaneous movement in prices in each 
market in the Simpson, et al., (2012) paper is deemed too strict, so this paper takes the model into an optimally 
lagged VECM and runs VECM based cointegration and exogeneity tests. 
There is a continuing need to monitor convergence or otherwise of various country electricity markets with 
country energy sector markets. There are policy implications relating to the degree of progress of electricity 
market deregulation and liberalisation in various countries, country economic groups and regions. The concept 
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of electricity liberalisation is based on the premise that, historically, electricity supply has been a natural 
monopoly and, as such, it has required costly regulation to enforce competition. The British model is the 
standard in OECD countries. This model began in the late 1980s with the privatisation and de-integration of the 
electricity industry where a system of competition was established to auction spare capacity through a central 
system. Anecdotally, such a system benefits large industrial consumers, but the benefits to domestic consumers 
are questionable when electricity supply through a public monopoly is compared to that through a regulated 
private monopoly. Whichever the case monopoly pricing through market power is expected to apply to inflate 
electricity prices. 
In this study, the starting point is to consider energy stock market sectors. It is first recognised that prices in 
domestic energy stock market sectors are dominated by energy costs in global energy supply from fossil fuels. 
Country energy sector prices thus depend to a large extent on global energy market prices, because country 
energy sectors represent companies involved in production and distribution of fossil fuels and fossil fuels have a 
global price. Prices in country electricity markets depend on both supply cost factors (based on global energy 
prices) interacting with local demand and pricing factors. The latter are in a large part affected by the degree of 
government intervention in relation to government ownership, deregulation, competition and privatisation in the 
various electricity industry processes of generation, transmission and distribution. A literature review from a 
search of energy economics publications reveals a recent increase in studies that examine the relationships 
between electricity prices and fossil fuel prices. Most evidence finds a relationship (either contemporaneous or 
lagged) but, the strength of those relationships varies in different countries.  
For example, Bosco, et al., (2006) finds a commonality of trend among European electricity prices and a 
long-term equilibrium relationship of this trend with oil prices. Asche, et al., (2006) in a UK study finds 
cointegration between natural gas, crude oil and electricity prices with a leading indicator role of crude oil. Other 
country studies show variations in the strength of relationships and causality between fossil fuel prices and 
electricity. For example, Mjelde and Bessler (2009) and Mohammadi (2009), utilised lagged times series models 
to explore integration, long-run equilibrium relationships and exogeneity between electricity prices and fossil 
fuels; a Chinese study by He, et al., (2010) examined coal prices and electricity markets; a Spanish electricity 
study by Mautinho, et al., (2011) found important relationships with energy commodity prices. 
Ferkingstad, et al., (2011) studied Nordic, German and UK electricity prices in contemporaneous and lagged 
time series models with oil, coal, gas, wind and water reservoir levels and find a link of electricity with gas. The 
UK electricity and British gas and electricity prices were found to adjust by themselves as fossil fuels and the 
Euro/USD exchange rate were weakly exogenous. Furio and Chulia (2012) find cointegration between Brent oil 
crude forwards, Zeebrugge gas forwards and Spanish electricity forwards with causality running from the fossil 
fuels to the electricity market.  
In relation to the analysis, the connection between energy stock market sectors in each country and fossil fuel 
supply costs (as components of electricity pricing) must first be examined bearing in mind the mixed findings of 
past cointegration studies on fossil fuel prices only. Oil remains the most important global source of energy and 
the prices of other fossil fuels show some correlation. The essential contribution to the literature in this paper is 
the specified model’s demonstration of the use of energy stock market sector prices, in lieu of global fossil fuel 
prices, to explain the extent of electricity market deregulation in various markets. 
Figure 1 demonstrates an implied important relationship between world oil prices (OPEC) and the global energy 
stock market sector. It is thus implicit that the prices of fossil fuels are correlated as energy stock market sectors 
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Figures 1 and 2 demonstrate implicitly that country energy stock market sectors are strongly related to global 
energy prices. However, the central question is whether or not strong relationships exist between country 
electricity and energy stock market sector prices. 
The issues for the study are as follows: 
1. Do sampled country electricity prices and their energy sector prices possess long-term equilibrium 
relationships? 
2. If evidence is produced of cointegration does short-term exogeneity run from the country energy sectors to the 
electricity sectors? 
The answers to these questions will lead to conclusions in relation to electricity market and energy sector 
decoupling (regulation) or convergence (deregulation/liberalisation) in different countries representative of 
country economic groups. It will provide a basic indicator model of the degree of electricity market liberalisation 
in the various countries investigated.  
1.1 Electricity Regulatory Environments and Energy Commodity Supply 
In all electricity markets studied, there are varying degrees of government intervention that affect domestic 
electricity supply and demand and therefore pricing. There are also varying degrees of internal renewables 
energy supply that affect electricity supply costs bearing in mind that energy stock market sectors reflect global 
supply prices of fossil fuels. Much of the following country examples of factual and background information on 
electricity markets is provided in the Simpson, et al., (2012) study. 
For example, in the US the reliance on fossil fuels in mainly coal and gas for power generation is well 
documented. The electricity sector includes a large number and array of stakeholders providing generation, 
transmission and distribution services to industrial and domestic consumers across the country. The market 
segments are regulated by different public institutions with some functional overlaps. The US government sets 
general policy through the Department of Energy but there are other public institutions that set policy for 
example in environmental impact and consumer protection. Economic regulation in distribution is a state 
government responsibility. The US is a very large electricity market and economy and the regulatory 
environment is favourable with electricity pricing less likely to be interfered with by government. It remains 
likely that US electricity prices will continue to show a stronger relationship with energy sector prices than many 
other countries. In addition, the regulatory environment has promoted competition and fairer pricing than in 
many other countries.  
The New Zealand electricity power transmission national grid is owned by the State owned enterprise, 
Transpower New Zealand Ltd. Seventy percent of energy supply is provided internally by renewables  
(hydropower, geothermal and wind) and while this makes New Zealand a low carbon dioxide emitter it is not a 
highly energy efficient country when comparing economic output to consumption. There is likely to be a weaker 
long-term relationship in New Zealand electricity markets with their energy sector because of greater regulation 
and reliance on domestic supplies of renewables. 
The electricity market in the EMU is mainly influenced by legislation passed in the European Union where 
electricity market liberalisation and security of supply has been promoted, for example, through the 2003 
International Market in Electricity Directive. The European Union has also legislated in energy policy when, for 
example, in October 2005 the European Council approved a comprehensive energy policy taking into account 
the fact that Europe is currently the largest importer of fossil fuels (oil and gas) in the world. Most energy supply 
is from fossil fuels. Uranium supplies nuclear power generation to a lesser extent, but the Europeans are 
committed by a council directive on Electricity Production from Renewable Energy Sources in 2001, which 
stated that 22% of European energy requirements from renewables needed to be in place by 2010. Europe is a 
very large electricity market. It is expected that due to a continued reliance on fossil fuels and substantial 
progress in electricity market liberalisation, electricity prices in the EMU will be reflected in a stronger 
relationship with energy stock market prices. 
The Argentina electricity market price is expected to possess a lower relationship with the energy sector price 
because fifty four percent of energy sources are internally generated in thermal systems and forty one percent are 
also internally supply from hydropower. Whilst the electricity market is one of the most deregulated and 
competitive in Latin America the government agency, the Energy Secretariat has the power of veto over 
CAMMESA (the administrator of the wholesale market) and can alter the functioning of the market in electricity 
generation, transmission and distribution. The Argentina electricity market is small compared to that in the EMU, 
China, and the United States. In addition the effect of the potential for government interference (through the 
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Energy Secretariat) on electricity demand and pricing is likely to be of greater importance in terms of 
explanatory power of electricity pricing over all periods of the study. 
In 1996 China’s Electric Power Law was implemented in order to develop the electricity industry and protect 
consumers and investors. It aimed to regulate the generation, distribution and consumption of electricity. In 2002 
the State Power Corporations monopoly was dismantled and 11 smaller corporations were established. The State 
Power Corporation had previously owned 46% of electricity generation and 90% of electricity of supply assets. 
Ongoing reforms are dealing with the separation of power plants from power supply networks, privatisation of a 
significant amount of stated owned property, the encouragement of competition and the revamping of pricing 
mechanisms. In relation to energy supply, 78% of power is generated from coal fired plants and around 15% is 
hydropower. China is a very large electricity market and economy but is still developing in terms of macro and 
micro economic reforms. It is still likely that there exists, in lagged data, a weaker relationship between 
electricity and energy sectors. 
Due to a strong surge in demand for electricity, the Malaysian government divested Tenaga Nasional (the owner 
of the national grid) in 1992 and awarded independent power producers (IPPs) licences to build plant and sell 
electricity to Tenaga for transmission and distribution. The licences were awarded without tender quite possibly 
to friends of the government and large profits were made at Tenaga’s expense. Malaysia’s electricity market is 
also small compared to those in, for example, the EMU, China and the United States. Whilst fossil fuels 
dominate renewables, such as hydropower in energy supply, the relationship between electricity prices and the 
energy market sector prices is expected to be lower over all periods of the study due to the probability of 
instances of corruption and government indirect interference in electricity pricing. 
2. Method 
The data in daily electricity prices and energy stock market indices for each country are compared in bivariate 
lagged models over a period from 31/12/1999 to 30/12/2011. The countries selected for investigation were those 
that have both electricity and energy market sector prices simultaneously reported over the period of the study. 
Data for electricity prices are extracted from Bloomberg’s and that for energy stock market sectors from 
DataStream.  
Electricity prices in each country reflect the prices paid by domestic and industrial users. Energy sector indices 
represent listed companies in each country in the businesses of production and distribution of energy in the 
predominant forms of oil, gas and coal. To partially control for differences between measurements of prices in 
different countries, the data are standardised in a logarithmic format. Structural break tests provided by Quandt 
(1988) and Andrews (1993) reveal a break at the beginning of the global financial crisis, but testing the model 
over two periods in unlagged data does not reveal enough evidence to suggest that the basic conclusions of the 
study should alter between the period up to the break, after the break and over the full period. The full period is 
therefore studied without any loss of degrees of freedom and it thus includes the rapid fall in energy prices 
during the global financial crisis from 2008. The countries selected for investigation are those that have both 
electricity and energy market sector prices simultaneously reported over the period of the study.  
Taking the contemporaneous model in Simpson, et al., (2012) further, an optimally lagged bivariate vector 




)()()(                     (1) 
Where; 
ti
EL is the electricity price in country i at time t . 
ti
EM is the energy sector index in country i at time t . This variable represents global factors such as global 
energy prices impacting country energy market prices as a determinant of country electricity prices. 
ti
 is the regression intercept reflecting current commencement or base electricity market prices and electricity 
market conditions for country i at time .t  
ti
e is the residual of the regression for country i at time t  representing the contribution to the variance of 
country electricity prices from factors other than energy sector price changes in country i  and this includes the 
domestic effect on prices of renewables costings and government regulation and control of the country electricity 
market. 
n  denotes the optimal lag determined by lag exclusion tests and information criteria. 




Unit root tests were run in Phillips Perron (PP), the latter deemed reliable, based on the evidence of structural 
breaks (Phillips & Perron, 1988). The PP test results are reported in Tables 1 and 2. 
 
Table 1. Unit root tests: Electricity prices 
Country electricity price Test statistic: Level series Test statistic: First differences 
US -1.7586 -59.2435* 
United Kingdom -0.7525 -58.6750* 
New Zealand -1.8735 -53.5843* 
Canada -1.8067 -54.3825* 
EMU -1.0163 -53.887* 
Argentina -1.6808 -46.9602* 
Brazil -1.0863 -54.3337* 
Chile -0.4004 -48.3921* 
Malaysia -2.2750 -56.7631* 
Thailand -1.1845 -58.7354* 
India -1.3012 -52.8482* 
Hong Kong -0.6891 -63.7173* 
China -1.8911 -54.3082* 
The Philippines -0.4305 -49.8534* 
Note: Critical values for PP test are -3.4326 at the 1% level; -2.8623 at the 5% level and -2.5672 at the 10% level. Level series test statistics 
are not significant at the 1% level. First difference test statistics are all significant at the 1% level and denoted * 
 
Table 2. Unit root tests: Energy sector prices and errors of the electricity price regression 
Country Energy sector in levels Energy sector in first differences Errors of electricity/energy 
sector regression in first 
differences 
US -1.0485 -61.2221* -267.4487* 
United Kingdom -1.6743 -57.5774* -267.4487* 
New Zealand -2.3907 -52.1353* -232.6754* 
Canada -1.7344 -55.3268* -203.7645* 
EMU -1.7154 -56.5766* -166.6072* 
Argentina -1.8629 -52.5680* -143.0318* 
Brazil -1.4431 -53.1784* -257.3371* 
Chile -1.6123 -49.2856* -167.5751* 
Malaysia -0.0216 -55.8923* -293.3868* 
Thailand -1.0323 -55.8577* -228.8398* 
India -1.0302 -50.3945* -188.7806* 
Hong Kong -0.5885 -55.1666* -152.6845* 
China -1.6096 -56.8573* -185.5977* 
The Philippines -0.6103 -55.3005* -353.9744* 
Note: Critical values for PP test are -3.4326 at the 1% level; -2.8623 at the 5% level and -2.5672 at the 10% level. Level series test statistics 
are not significant at the 1% level. First difference test statistics are all significant at the 1% level and denoted * 
 
The level series are non-stationary in each case and the first differences are stationary, including the errors of the 
various relationships. In each case it was evident that the variables were integrated non-stationary processes and 
the analysis moved to VAR analysis, in order to discover the appropriate lag order and to run initial cointegration 
tests after testing the VAR model for stability. When cointegration is discovered in a country VAR, it is, with the 
discovered lag order, respecified into a VECM and the variables re-tested for cointegration (Johansen, 1988).  
If cointegration is re-discovered in the VECM Granger causality tests (Granger, 1988) and impulse response 
functions are run for each country concerned. Cointegration and Granger causality results follow for each 
country economic group and the results of impulse response functions are reported in Appendix 1 for countries 
that demonstrate cointegration evidence with Granger causality evidence either dual or one-way between 
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electricity and energy markets. Tables 3 and 4 show the cointegration and exogeneity test results for the country 
groups where cointegrating relationships are discovered. 
OECD 
 




Granger causality in price 
changes/maximum significant F 
statistic 




At least 1 equation according to 
Trace and Maximum Eigenvalue 
statistics. Optimum lag according to 
Akaike information criteria is one 
day. 
Data trend:  
Linear 
Test type:  
Intercept and 
 trend. 
Granger causality runs from US 
electricity sector to US energy 
sector/2.7539** 
2 days**.  
United 
Kingdom 
At least 1 equation according to 
Trace and Maximum Eigen value 
statistics. Optimum lag according to 
Akaike information criteria is 1 day. 
Data trend: None 
Test type: No 
intercept with no 
trend.  
Dual causality*** but stronger 
causality is from UK electricity 
sector to UK energy sector/8.1027* 
2 days*.  
New 
Zealand  
At least 1 equation according to 
Trace statistics. Optimum lag 
according to Akaike information 
criteria 1 day.* 
Data trend: None.
Test type:  
No intercept with 
no trend. 
No significant Granger causality 
on a one day up to five lags. 
No evidence of  
Granger causality. . 
Canada 
No cointegration according to Trace 
and Maximum Eigen value statistics. 
No cointegration. 
Not applicable 
No cointegration. Not applicable 
No cointegration. Not 
applicable 
EMU 
At least 1 equation according to 
Trace and Maximum Eigen value 
statistics. Optimum lag according to 
Akaike information criteria 1 day.* 
Data trend: None.
Test type:  
No intercept with 
no trend. 
No significant evidence of Granger 
causality on lags of one up to five 
days. 
No evidence of 
Granger causality.  
 
Note: For Tables 3 and 4 the cointegration lag order for the VAR/VECM is deduced from information criteria. The assumptions relate to 
trends and intercepts. Granger causality is taken from pairwise tests of the bivariate models with the lag on log differenced variables based on 
significant maximum F statistics. *denotes significance at the 1% level and ** denotes significance at the 5% level. *** denotes significance 
at the 10% level.  
 
Cointegration represents evidence that the markets have not decoupled, which in this study represents a degree of 
market liberalisation, with global fossil fuel prices as the significant drivers of energy stock market sector prices. 
If the markets are not cointegrated it may be assumed that either market liberalisation is progressing slowly or 
that governments or public or private monopoly pricing mechanisms are interfering in electricity pricing to a 
substantial extent or that renewables costs are driving electricity costs. It could be a combination of these factors. 
In these cases it may be concluded that with greater domestic cost pressures, there is less liberalisation. It is of 
course possible that if renewables costs are the drivers of electricity prices, market liberalisation could still be 
progressing with less government regulatory interference. 
Table 3 shows that there is at least one cointegrating equation in the interaction of electricity and energy sectors 
in the OECD sample in the US, the UK, New Zealand and the EMU over the long-term. More-over, in the 
short-term it is evident that exogeneity runs from the electricity sector to the energy sector in the US and the UK 
on a 3 and 2 day lag respectively. It is evident that electricity prices are the leading indicators in those countries. 
Impulse response functions (See Appendix 1), where the electricity price change is delivered a one standard 
deviation shock, show that in the US and the UK the lag is 3 days and 2 days respectively. After these lags the 
energy markets in price changes commence their move towards stability, which is achieved in around 6 days and 
4 days respectively.  
In the US, the EMU and UK major deregulation steps have been taken and the regulatory environment is 
favourable, with electricity pricing less likely to be interfered with by government or monopoly pricing. It 
remains likely that the US, the EMU and the UK electricity prices will continue to show a stronger relationship 
with energy sector prices than many other countries. In addition, the regulatory environments have promoted 
competition and fairer pricing than in many other countries. Whilst evidence of exogeneity via Granger causality 
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tests is not found in the EMU and New Zealand long-term equilibrium relationships exist between electricity and 
energy sectors thus providing evidence of a degree of liberalisation. The relationships are not as strong in New 
Zealand. There is no evidence of cointegration in Canadian markets. New Zealand, though a developed country, 
is a comparatively small electricity market and economy. In terms of the results reported in this paper that there 
is a weaker relationship between energy market sectors and electricity prices (decoupling) over all periods of the 
study, first because of the dominance of internal renewables supplies (less influenced by global supply costs of 
fossil fuels) and second, because of the probable influence of a state owned monopoly on electricity pricing. 
Whilst there are cointegrating relationships between electricity and energy markets in New Zealand and the 
EMU there is no evidence of Granger causality in the short-term in those countries and there appears no 
cointegrating or Granger causal relationships in Canada.  
Latin America 
The results of the VECM based tests for the Latin American countries in the sample produce no evidence of 
significant long-term cointegrating relationships or of short- term exogeneity dynamics. In the cases of these 
Latin American countries, when lagged data are considered in a VECM, it is evident, by implication, that 
domestic factors overwhelmingly dominate explanatory power. With the example earlier provided in this paper 
of Argentina, it is evident in lagged data that decoupling exists between electricity and energy sectors and 
therefore indicative of a regulated electricity market where electricity prices are driven by both government 
interference and renewables costings. 
Asia 
Table 4 shows the results of the VECM cointegration and Granger causality tests for the Asian countries in the 
sample. 
 
Table 4. VECM results for cointegration and exogeneity: Asian countries 
Country Cointegration Test 
assumptions 
Granger causality in price  
changes/maximum significant F  
statistic 
Lag for  
exogeneity of  
price changes 
China No cointegration according to Trace and 
Maximum Eigenvalue statistics.  
Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
Hong Kong At least 1 equation according to Trace 
and Maximum Eigen value statistics. 
Optimum lag according to Akaike 
information criteria is 2 days. 
Data trend:  
Linear 
Test type:  
Intercept with 
 trend. 
Energy sector drives electricity 
sector in price changes/31.1380** 
2 days* 
 
India At least 1 equation according to Trace 
and maximum Eigenvalue statistics  
Optimum lag according to Akaike 
information criteria 1 day.* 
Data trend:  
None. 
Test type:  
No intercept 
with no trend. 
No significant Granger causality 




Malaysia No cointegration according to Trace and 
Maximum Eigen value statistics. 
Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
The 
Philippines 
At least 1 equation according to Trace 
and Maximum Eigen value statistics. 
Optimum lag according to Akaike 
information criteria 1 day.* 
Data trend:  
Linear 
Test type:  
Intercept with  
trend. 
Granger causality flows from the 
electricity market to the energy 
market on a 1 day lag***/3.1052 
1 day***.  
Thailand At least 1 equation according to Trace 
and Maximum Eigen value statistics. 
Optimum lag according to Akaike 
information criteria 1 day.* 
Data trend:  
None 
Test type:  
No intercept 
with no trend. 
Granger causality runs from the 
energy sector to the electricity 
sector on a 1 day lag/6.5727* 
1 day*.  
Note: For Tables 3 and 4 the cointegration lag order for the VAR/VECM is deduced from information criteria. The assumptions relate to 
trends and intercepts. Granger causality is taken from pairwise tests of the bivariate models with the lag on log differenced variables based on 
significant maximum F statistics. *denotes significance at the 1% level and ** denotes significance at the 5% level. *** denotes significance 
at the 10% level.  
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Cointegration evidence is found in Hong Kong, India, the Philippines and Thailand. This indicates progress in 
liberalisation in those markets when lagged data are considered. No evidence of Granger causality is discovered 
in India, however causality runs from the energy sector to the electricity sector in Hong Kong and Thailand on a 
one day lag. This indicates that a partial driver of the electricity markets in each of these countries is the energy 
sector. Reverse Granger causality applies in the Philippines (on a one day lag) thus indicating that the electricity 
sector is the leading indicator of the energy sector of the stock market.  
In each of the Hong Kong, the Philippines markets evidence is produced that when the electricity market is 
shocked by one standard deviation the energy market commences its move to stability one day after the shock 
and attains stability some three days after the shock. In the Thailand markets the move to stability of the energy 
sector commences one day after the shock but stability is still not achieved up to ten days after the shock. There 
is no evidence of cointegration in Chinese markets or in Malaysian markets thus indicating, when lagged data are 
considered, an electricity market that has decoupled from the energy market due to stronger forces of 
government interference in electricity pricing or that the process of liberalisation has not advanced due to 
lagging micro and micro economic reforms in the electricity sector.  
The results of Granger causality tests are unclear in terms of the exogeneity of the energy market sectors. Further 
testing is needed so the error correction terms of the VECMs are revisited for further analysis. Table 5 shows the 
error correction terms for the country bivariate VECMs where there is evidence of cointegration on a lag order of 
one-two days. The error correction terms show the speed of each variable in the bivariate model towards 
equilibrium in the model. Absolute values are considered as a negative term indicates that the variable moves to 
stability from above equilibrium and the positive sign indicates the move to stability from below equilibrium.  
The greater the magnitude of any statistically significant error correction term, the greater the speed towards 
stability of the model thus confirming exogeneity and the strength of the degree of liberalisation of the particular 
electricity markets (That is, the strength of the relationship between electricity and energy stock market sectors 
and thus the strength of the relationship between electricity markets and global fossil fuel prices). The t statistics 
in excess of 1.75 in absolute terms are considered significant at the 10% level. The t statistics are in parenthesis. 
In the various country-bivariate models it is expected that the energy sector (reflecting global fossil fuel prices) 
will be the exogenous force as the driver of the electricity market prices. When error correction terms are 
considered, the US and Indian markets exhibit reverse causality, where the electricity markets drive their energy 
markets. 
 
Table 5. Error correction terms 
Country First differences: 
Electricity prices  
treated endogenously 
First differences: Energy 
sector prices treated  
endogenously 
Ranking of  




US -0.0065 (-2.4577)** -0.0012 (-0.7229) 6 US electricity market 
UK -0.0014 (-0.4929) 0.0209 (3.5414)* 1 UK energy market  
The EMU -0.0006 (-0.2743) 0.0078 (2.2283)** 7 The EMU energy 
market 
New Zealand -7.81E-05 (-0.0748) 0.0027 (2.1445)** 8 NZ energy market 
Hong Kong -0.0035 (-1.3330) 0.0078 (2.8694)** 4 HK energy market 
India -0.0070 (-3.2190)* -0.0011 (-0.4984) 2 The Indian electricity 
market is exogenous  
The Philippines -0.0008 (-0.7763) -0.0034 (-2.7717)** 5 The Philippines energy 
market 
Thailand -8.89E-05 (-0.8287) 0.0068 (3.1115)* 3 The Thailand energy 
market  
Note: Significance levels are at 10%*, 5%** and 1%* 
 
Table 5 shows that the models behave as expected in terms of exogeneity of energy market sectors (where 
energy stock markets, and therefore fossil fuel prices are the drivers of the electricity markets), except in the 
cases of the larger electricity markets of the US and India. It may well be that this is because these latter 
electricity markets are so large that they are partial drivers of global fossil fuel prices.  
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Nevertheless, in all of these cases it is posited that the strong relationship between electricity and energy markets 
represents progress in deregulation of the markets away from the control by private or public monopolies and 
government electricity pricing interference. If the speed towards equilibrium is reflected in the magnitude of the 
error correction term and that term is also an indicator of the degree of liberalisation of the electricity market (the 
degree of reliance on global fossil fuel prices) it might be said that the greater degree of deregulation is reflected 
in the rankings from 1 to 8 as follows: UK, India, Thailand, Hong Kong, the Philippines, the US, the EMU and 
New Zealand in that order. 
4. Discussion  
Support is provided for the work of Bosco et al (2006), Asche et al (2006), Mjelde and Bessler (2009), 
Mohammadi (2009), He, Zhang, Yang, Wang and Wang (2010), Mautinho, Vieira, and Moreira (2011), 
Ferkingstad, Lolan and Wilhelmsen (2011) and Furio and Chulia (2012). All of these researchers discovered 
long-term cointegrating relationships with fossil fuels. In summary, Bosco et al finds long-term equilibrium of 
electricity with oil prices in Europe; Asche with oil and gas in the UK; Mjelde and Bessler and Mohammadi with 
fossil fuels; He, Zhang, Yang, Wang and Wang with coal; Mautinho, Vieira, and Moreira in Spain with energy 
commodities; Ferkingstad, Lolan and Wilhelmsen in Nordic, German and UK electricity markets with gas and 
Furio and Chulia again in Spain examined electricity futures and futures markets in Brent oil crude and 
Zeebrugge gas and find cointegration with exogeneity lying with the fossil fuels.  
The results in this study differ from those in the contemporaneous model developed by Simpson et al (2012). In 
the latter study the results imply significant unlagged relationships in each of the countries sampled between 
electricity and energy stock markets, thus implying differing degrees of electricity market liberalisation. The 
unlagged model shows that the larger economies whether developed or developing countries (EMU, China, US, 
India, UK) demonstrated stronger relationships thereby indicating greater electricity market liberalisation. In 
some economies such as New Zealand and Argentina there was a heavy use of renewables and this, combined 
with domestic regulatory costs, reduced the strength of the relationship between electricity and the energy sector.  
When optimal lags are introduced (on the assumption that the markets in each country in reality do not react to 
each other contemporaneously), and a VECM is tested, many of the previously significant unlagged relationships 
in the Simpson et al (2012) study disappear. Cointegrating relationships are found in the OECD in all countries 
studied except Canada (where it is expected in future research that the US and the Canadian markets would be 
found to be closely related). Cointegrating relationships are not found in Latin America. In Asia cointegrating 
relationships are found in Hong Kong, India, the Philippines and Thailand, but not in China and Malaysia.   
There is some support for exogeneity lying with the energy stock market sector on lags of one to two days in the 
various countries where cointegration is evident, but the results of the Granger causality tests are unclear. 
Re-examination of the error correction terms in the VECM on a lag order of 1-2 days confirms that in the US and 
India exogeneity lies with electricity sector. This implies that in those countries, because of the size of their 
markets and their influence on global fossil fuel prices, that it is the electricity market that is the leading 
indicator and not energy market sectors. In all of the other cointegrated markets (UK, the EMU, New Zealand, 
Hong Kong, The Philippines and Thailand) exogeneity as expected, lies with the energy market sector. In the 
cointegrated markets where there is evidence of Granger causality, impulse response functions confirm that 
when a shock is delivered to the electricity markets the path to stability of the models commence on a lag of 1 to 
3 days and equilibrium is achieved quite rapidly within 3 to 7 days except in the case of Thailand where 
equilibrium is still not achieved after 10 days. 
With respect to the error correction terms these indicate the speed of adjustment in each model and the speed 
explains how far advanced the countries are in terms of their deregulation. Higher speeds of adjustment mean 
greater degrees of deregulation than countries with a lower speed of adjustment. Speed of adjustment also 
explains how efficient the market is in terms of information adjustment speed between markets. A faster speed of 
adjustment means greater market efficiency. 
5. Limitations 
Electricity is not a commodity where the law of one price will hold across borders. This paper makes the broad 
assumption, however, that if electricity prices are quoted for a country the implication is that there is a single 
electricity market in that country. Moreover, different countries have differing energy for electricity generation. 
The limitation of this study is that it cannot fully compare an energy stock market sector price, which is based on 
global fossil fuel prices, to prices of sources of energy for electricity based mainly in nuclear or renewables. It 
must assume that the main drivers of electricity prices in an open market are the prices of fossil fuels, but in 
reality for many countries this is unlikely to be the case. There are also different technologies in different 
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countries which may render markets in some countries inefficient in terms of costs of electricity production. 
Future research might take into account differences between countries in the relationships due to seasonality in 
Northern and Southern hemispheres. These limitations make the paper theoretical with some empirical evidence 
that affords it limited applicability to models of electricity and energy market pricing. 
6. Conclusion 
In this study, where lags are introduced in a VECM specification for a representative sample of OECD, Latin 
American and Asia economies, the most liberalised electricity markets (according to the strength of the indirect 
connection with global fossil fuels with the energy stock market sector through evidence of cointegration), are 
the OECD countries of the US, the UK, the EMU, and New Zealand and the Asian countries in Hong Kong, 
India, the Philippines and Thailand. In these countries, it is posited, that there is less influence on the electricity 
prices of regulatory costs than in for example, the Latin American countries, China and Malaysia where there is 
no evidence of cointegration. A continuing nexus between electricity prices and energy sectors has market 
liberalisation implications as well as environmental implications, because of the continuing dependence on fossil 
fuels. 
Where cointegration evidence is found it suggests that, whilst electricity and energy prices might behave 
differently in the short-term due to different degrees of market regulation, the prices converge in the long-run 
with energy sectors reacting directly to the market interaction of global fossil fuel supply and demand conditions. 
It is posited that this long-term relationship represents rational expectations and a greater degree of electricity 
market liberalisation (less interference in electricity pricing through private or public electricity monopolies than 
in those countries where cointegration is not evident).  
As mentioned, there is no evidence of strong liberalisation and deregulation of the Latin American electricity 
markets based on cointegration and exogeneity testing. Some of the countries in the sample have a strong 
dependence on renewables (For example, Argentina), but it is put that this only means greater electricity market 
liberalisation if there is minimal government interference in pricing. As mentioned, in some countries where the 
markets are cointegrated there is no evidence of Granger causality. As an alternative to Granger exogeneity tests 
the study considered the magnitude and significance of the error correction terms from a VECM on a lag order of 
1-2 days. This confirms exogeneity of electricity markets in the US and India perhaps because of their size and 
their influence of their markets on global fossil fuel prices.  
In the cases of New Zealand, the EMU, the UK, Hong Kong, the Philippines and Thailand when error correction 
terms are considered, exogeneity lies with the energy sectors as expected. Additional evidence of causality and 
equilibrium relationships is provided in impulse response functions, which are considered only for those 
countries where there is Granger causality evidence. That is, for the US, the UK, Hong Kong, The Philippines 
and Thailand. Impulse response functions verify that the path towards equilibrium in those countries commences 
in 1-3 days and that equilibrium (except in the case of Thailand) is achieved after 3-7 days.  
It is demonstrated in this study that lagged bivariate models of electricity and energy stock market sectors, in 
their relaxation of the assumption of contemporaneous adjustment, can better explain the extent of country and 
perhaps regional electricity market liberalisation. More research is needed to apply the lagged model to a greater 
range of countries where electricity prices are reported daily together with energy stock market sectors and when 
more is known about the costs of nuclear and renewables power generation.  
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Appendix 1: Impulse Response Functions for countries with long-term equilibrium relationships 
Note: In each case, the interest lies in the response of the energy sector to a one standard deviation shock (See 
Cholesky one S.D Innovation) to the electricity sector in price changes. The response of the energy sector mainly 
indicates that the optimal lag is the point of commencement of the movement of the exogenous variable towards 
equilibrium or stability. Number of periods in days is on the horizontal axis in each case. 
The main graphs to peruse are therefore on the bottom left panel for each country. E.g. Response of Oilgsus to 
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